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In this paper, I argue against the two major approaches to the semantics 
of tense: the quantificational approach and the referential approach. The 
difference between them lies in the fact that the former is in favor of the 
indefinite view of tense, whereas the latter the definite view of tense. 
Tenses are characterized by the variability in the sense that they can be 
interpreted as being indefinite in some context or definite in other 
context. The difficulty the two approaches are faced with is that neither 
takes an appropriate account of the variability of tense. To provide a 
proper semantic treatment of tense, I propose in this paper a treatment of 
tense which incorporates choice functions. The choice functions, which 
apply to a non-empty set of intervals, pick the most salient time the speak-
er might have in mind at the utterance time. This might assist in captur-
ing the variability of tense. (Mean-Young Song, Dongguk University) 
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1 Introduction 
This paper is mainly concerned with exploring a proper semantic treat-
ment of tense in English The difficulty we frequently encounter in deal-
ing with tense is that tense shows the variability in meaning, depending 
on the context of use. To put it differently, in some context, the even-
tuality under the scope of tense is interpreted as being true at any time 
denoted by that tense, and in other context, on the other hand, the even-
* I would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and 
suggestions. The earlier version of this paper was presented at the 8th annual conference of 
the English Language and Literature Association of Korea, which was held from June 28 to 
June 30 this year. I am also grateful to the audience for their comments. As usual, all re-
maining errors are, of course, my own. This work is supported by Korea Research 
Foundation Grant (KRF-2004-003-A00l52). 
830 Song, Mean-Young 
tuality p1cked by the tense in question is interpreted as being true at a 
particular time supplied by the context. The former is referred to as an in-
definite tense or indeterminacy of tense, while the latter a definite tense or 
determinacy of tense. To illustrate this, consider the following sentences: 
(1) a. John Baird invented television. 
b. Mary went to school yesterday. 
Suppose that the speaker of a sentence like (la) does not know the exact 
time when John Baird invented television, and that he or she simply 
knows who invented television. One should notice that a sentence like 
(la) certainly makes sense even in this situation. Given this, (la) is in-
terpreted to mean that there exists a past time at which John Baird in-
vented television, which is certainly indefinite. In contrast, a sentence 
like (lb) carries the meaning that Mary went to school at a time which 
is included in the day before the utterance time. Since temporal adver-
bials like yesterday refers to a specific time, the past tense in (lb) makes 
reference to a definite time. As was seen sentences like (la) and (lb), thus, 
the interpretation of tenses might be different from context to context. 
There are two major approaches to the meaning of tense in the se-
mantic treatment of tense: the quantificational and the referential 
approach. The quantificational approach makes a point in favor of the 
indefinite view of tense, while the referential approach the definite view 
of tense. As sentences like (la) and (lb) indicate, however, neither of the 
two approaches is sufficient to handle tense in a proper way. This is 
mainly due to the variability of tense. Instead of providing an analysis 
which can capture the semantic variability of tense, the two theories on-
ly account for one part of the readings available in temporal expressions. 
As a device to capture the variability, this paper will propose a proper 
semantic treatment of tense by incorporating choice functions. The 
choice functions for tense apply to a non-empty set of intervals denoted 
by temporal predicates like past, present, and future and select the most 
salient interval at the time of utterance of a sentence. The interval 
picked by the choice functions might be definite or indefinite, depend-
ing upon the context of use. By doing so, we would be able to present a 
unified semantic treatment of tense. 
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 includes the discussion of 
what the quantificational theory is like, along with the problems with 
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the theory. In section 3, I will account for the properties of the refer-
ential theory of tense and its problems. Section 4 is devoted to the dis-
cussion of the motivation of choice functions, along with the basic ideas 
of choice functions. The main purpose in section 5 is to extend the 
choice functions to the treatment of tenses. The choice functions cannot 
apply to empty sets. Section 6 is mainly concerned with what might 
happen to the choice function analysis of tense, when the choice func-
tions apply to an empty set. 
2 The Quantification Theory of Tense 
The classical formal semantics (Prior (1967, 1968), Montague (1973), 
Dowty (1979), and Stump (1985) among others) adopts the view that 
tense is interpreted to be indefinite. According to this, the eventualities 
under the scope of the tense operator is true or false at any past or fu-
ture time. This kind of treatment of tense is characterized by existential 
quantification over intervals, as illustrated in (2a) and (2b), and hence it 
is often referred to as the quantificational theory of tense. 
(2) a. Psi> is true iff:31': l' < t and si> is true at l' 
b. Fsi> is true iff:3 1': t < t' and si> is true at t' 
(2a) says the formula Psi> is true iff there is a past time at which si> is 
obtained. (2a) and (2b) show that P and F are implicit existential quanti-
fiers over past times and future times respectively. Let us take the fol-
lowing sentence for instance: 
(3) a. John went to school 
b. POohn-went-to-school) 
A sentence like (3a) is translated into (3b). According to (2a), (3b) is true 
at a time t iff there is some time t' prior to t and John goes to school is 
true at t: This kind of interpretation suggests that tense is treated as 
indefinite. As we saw in (2a) and (2b), the above treatment of tense is 
mainly characterized by existential quantification over times in the me-
talanguage and the fact that tense is taken to be a sentential operator. 
Dowty (1979) shows different positions from what we discussed in 
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(2a-b) in the sense that an explicit existential quantifier over intervals is 
involved in the interpretation of tense, along with the introduction of 
the AT operator, as illustrated in (4). 
(4) 3t[tense(t) & AT(t, <is)],1) where tense is a one-place predicate and 
<is is a formula. 
According to (4), (3a) translates as (5): 
(5) 3t[past(t) & AT(t, john-goes-to school)] 
(5) roughly says that there is a past time t and at t John went to school. 
Thus, (5) is semantically equivalent to (3b), which indicates the past 
tense in (5) is indefinite. However, the difference between (3b) and (5) is 
that in (3b), the existential quantifier occurs in the meta-language, while 
it occurs in the object language in (5). Thus, the former and the latter 
are referred to as a metalanguage analysis and an object-language analy-
sis, respectively. 
As was mentioned above, the quantificational theory of tense is char-
acterized by the treatment of tense as indefinite. Given this, one might 
argue that the treatment of tense as indefinite is semantically equivalent 
to that of the present perfect in the sense that the latter refers to an in-
definite point of time. For example, the indefinite past tense is in-
terpreted in the same way as the present perfect. We can witness this 
view in Montague (1973), Reichenbach (1947), and Stump (1985). Montague 
treats the English present perfect as the indefinite past. However, this 
view has some problems, which will be elaborated upon in what follows.2) 
A piece of evidence against the view is that it cannot account for the 
acceptability of (6a) in which the past tense occurs with a past time ad-
verb like yesterday and the unacceptability of a sentence like (6b) 
where the present perfect takes place. 
(6) a. John went on a picnic with Mary yesterday 
b *John has gone on a picnic with Mary yesterday 
1) In this formula, tense refers to a temporal predicate. 
2) I will give brief arguments which are against this view to save space. The reader can refer 
to Song (1999) and Song (2000), where I have presented a more detailed discussion of the 
problems with the indefinite past approach to the present perfect. 
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(7) a. ??John went on a picnic with Mary several times 
b. John has gone on a picnic with Mary several times before 
Given that the past tense is interpreted in the same way as the present 
perfect in the sense that they both refer to an indefinite time, we would 
have to expect that (6a) would be no more grammatical than (6b) is, 
contrary to fact. It is worth noticing that unlike the present perfect, the 
past tense may refer to a definite time (i.e. a particular time the speaker 
has in mind). Thus, the past tense is compatible with past time adverbs 
like yesterday denoting a specific time, as in (6a), while this is not the 
case with the present perfect, as in (6b). The same argument holds for 
sentences like (7a-b). That is, adverbs like several times and before de-
scribe that the event under the scope of the perfect has repeated several 
times without presenting a specific time. Thus, the view that the inter-
pretation of the past tense is equivalent to that of the perfect would 
have to expect that like (7b), (7a) is grammatical, contrary to fact. 
The following sentences also make a point against the view that the 
past tense is semantically equivalent to the present perfect. 
(8) a. * John left now 
b. John has left now 
According to this view, a sentence like (8a) is truth-conditionally equiv-
alent to (8b). However, the past tense in (8a) is incompatible with a 
speech-time-oriented adverb like now, whereas this is not the case with 
the present perfect in (8b). The key distinction between the past tense 
and the present perfect lies in the fact that the former subsumes events 
which took place in a period of time which is wholly past, whereas the 
latter establishes the present relevance of an eventuality which took 
place in the past. Thus, the past tense cannot occur with a speech-
time-oriented adverb like now, as illustrated in (8a). In contrast, the pres-
ent perfect is compatible with now. 
2.1. Problems with the Quantificational Theory3) 
Partee (1973) argues that the quantificational theory of tense is in-
3) Notice that Partee's (1973) and Enr;:'s (1986) arguments against the quantificational theory of 
tense which will be discussed below in this section serve as pieces of evidence in favor of 
the referential theory. 
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appropriate for the tenses in natural language. She provides the follow-
ing example as a piece of evidence against the theory: 
(9) I didn't turn off the stove. 
A sentence like (9) shows the deictic use of the past tense. In other 
words, when (9) is uttered, the past tense is used to refer to a specific 
time, given the situation where the speaker uttered (9) while driving 
halfway down the turnpike. However, the quantificational theory fails to 
capture the right interpretation of (9). The Priorian analysis of tense 
would have to predict that (9) can be represented as in (lOa) and (lOb). 
(10) a. -'P(I-turn-off-the-stove) 
b. P-{I-turn-off-the-stove) 
In (lOa), the negation takes wider scope than the past tense operator, 
while the scopal relation is reversed in (lOb). (lOa) says that there is a 
past time such that I didn't turn off the stove, which is too weak, given 
the circumstance mentioned above, and on the other hand, (lOb) says 
that it is not the case that I ever turned off the stove, which is too 
strong. Hence, neither (lOa) nor (lOb) are appropriate for the intended 
meaning conveyed by the sentence in (9). 
En<; (1986) also argues that the quantificational theory of tense fails to 
provide a proper treatment of tense. She presents the following sentence 
which serves as a counter-example to the quantificational theory: 
(11) Every member of our investment club will buy a house 
A sentence like (11) can be represented as (12a) and (12b) in terms of the 
quantificational theory: 
(12) a F(V x[m-of-c (x) ---7 buy(x, a-house)])4) 
b. v x[m-of-c (x) ---7 F(buy(x, a-house))] 
(l2a), in which the future tense operator take wide scope over the uni-
versal quantifier, says that there will be a future time at which every 
4) In this representation, "m-of-c" is short for "member of our investment club." I also ignore 
the translation of the indefinite article for simplicity. 
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member of our investment club buys a house. On the other hand, (12b), 
in which the scopal relation between the tense operator and the univer-
sal quantifier is reversed, says that for every member of our investment 
club, there will be a future time at which he or she buys a house. 
According to En (1986), (11) is interpreted to mean that every-cur-
rent-and-future member will buy a house. Hence, she claims that neither 
of the two represents the right reading of (11). That is, (12a) only refers to 
every future member of our investment club, whereas (12b) every current 
member. Thus, (12a) and (12b) cannot capture the right reading of (11). 
This kind of argument basically assumes the meaning of the ex-
pression member of our investment club in the following way: the exc 
tension of member of our investment club denotes the set of members 
of our investment club at time t. Thus, as we saw in (12a-b), if the NP is 
under the scope of the tense operator F, then the evaluation time for the 
time t will be shifted into the future time, and, in consequence, this will 
pick only the future members from the domain of the set. If the NP is 
outside the scope of the tense operator F, on the other hand, then the 
evaluation time will be the present, or the utterance time, and the NP 
only refers to current members. 
However, one should notice that the range of quantifiers may be dif-
ferent from context to context. To illustrate this, consider the following 
sentence: 
(13) Every boy loves Susan 
A sentence like (13) does not imply that every boy in the world loves 
Susan. Instead, it means that every boy relevant to the discourse loves 
Susan. Likewise, when the speaker utters a sentence like (11), he or she in-
tends to imply that every member who is relevant at the utterance time 
who is picked from the domain of the set denoted by every will buy a 
house. Thus, the extension of a quantified NP like every member of our 
investment club at a time t may be independent of the time or times at 
which the proposition under the scope of tense is evaluated. This suggests 
that En<;'s arguments bear no relation to the issue of whether tense is 
treated as an operator since the domain of a quantified NP seems to be 
context-dependently determined without respect to tense operators.5) 
5) There are various ways to incorporate the fact about the context dependency of the quan-
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The quantificational theory also has difficulty dealing with the follow-
ing sentences: 
(14) a. John did not die in New York. 
b. John did not lose his head. 
Let us consider (14a) first. According to the quantificational theory, the 
IL translation of a sentence like (14a) can be represented as (lsa) and (lsb): 
(15) a. --'P[die-in-New-York'(j)] 
b. P-'[die-in-New-York'(j)] 
What (lsa) says is that John never died in New York at any past time, 
while (lsb) says that there was some past time at which John did not 
die in New York. Suppose that John actually died in Boston. Given this, 
(lsa) is the correct reading for (14a), whereas (ISb) is not. This is because 
what the past sentence in (14a) says is that there was no past time 
whatsoever at which John died in New York. Thus, (ISb) is in-
appropriate for the meaning of (14a) since it is too weak. The same argu-
ment goes for a sentence like (14b). 
3. The Referential Theory of Tense 
The referential theory of tense that adopts the determinacy of tense 
treats temporal expressions in analogy to the treatment of nominal ex-
pressions without positing an existential quantification over times.6),?) 
According to this approach, the reference time is determined by the con-
text of use. That is, the most salient local evaluation time is contextually 
supplied. As a device to capture this, the referential theory assumes that 
tified NPs into the semantic interpretation. One possible way would be to interpret mem-
ber of our investment club as denoting the set of all past-present-future members, and 
then allow the context to pick some subset of this. I will not go into the details of this 
since this is beyond the present study. 
6) We can see this kind of approach in the discourse representation theory. 
7) Reichenbach (1947) contains the first attempt to treat tense as being definite within the 
framework of formal semantics, even though he does not. explicitly address that tense is 
determinate. I had already pointed this out in Song (2005). To save space, I will not go into 
details of this. The reader can refer to it. 
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tense bears an index just like nominal expressions such as pronouns, as 
in John PAST2 leave Seoul (see Partee (1984), En<;: (1987), and Abusch 
(1997) among others). Thus, the sentence John PAST2 leave Seoul would 
be true if for some function g from free variables to appropriate refer-
ents, get) precedes the utterance time and get) is a time at which Mary 
leaves Seoul. 
Given this, we can define the semantics of each tense as follows under 
the referential theory: 
(16) a. PRE& is defined with respect to u and g iff gO) overlaps u. 
When defined, 11 PRESdlu,g = gO) 
b. PASTi is defined with respect to u and g iff g(i) < u. 
When defined, IIPASTdlu,g = g(i) 
c. FUTi is defined with respect to u and g iff u < g(i). 
When defined, IIFUHu,g = g(i) 
In (16a-c), g is a function which assigns indices to appropriate referents 
(or times) and u is the utterance time. For example, the value of PAST2 
in the above sentence is determined by the function g applied to the in-
dex 2, i.e. g(2), and g(2) precedes the utterance time since the sentence 
in question is in the past. Recall that g(2) refers to the most salient time 
picked out by the sentence. 
Let us take the following sentence for instance and see how the refer-
ential analysis fits in. 
(17) Mary won the race 
A sentence like (17) would have an LF representation like (18) in terms 
of the referential view: 
(18) Mary PAST2 won the race 
The resulting translation of (18) would be something like (19).8) 
8) The translation is a result from the application of the following semantics of the simple 
tenses, the present, the past, and the future, as in Cia-c) respectively: 
(i) a PRESi translates as ,\P[PRES(ti) & P(tD] 
b. PASTi translates as lI.P[PAST(tD & pet,)] 
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(19) PAST(h) & won' (m, the-race, h)9) 
The translation in (19) is characterized by the fact that no quantification 
over times is involved in this translation and that a free variable (i.e. 12) 
occurs. The value of the free variable 12 is anchored by the most salient 
time in the context. This contrasts with the translation of tense adopted 
by the quantificational theory in which a variable denoting times is 
bound by the existential quantifier. When a formula contains free varia-
bles, it is evaluated with respect to a certain value assignment to the 
free variables which are determined not by semantics, but by the con-
text of use, i.e. pragmatics. The free valuables are felicitous if the con-
text provides enough information to evaluate them. Otherwise, they are 
not felicitous. 
Given the presuppositions in (16a-c), the truth conditions for (19) can 
be sated as follows. The past sentence (17) presupposes that IIPAST2I1M, w, g, u 
is defined iff for some function g from indices to appropriate referents, 
g(2) precedes u. When this presupposition is felicitous, IIPAST(12) & won' 
(m, the-race, h)IIM, w, g, u is true iff h is prior to u, and Mary wins the 
race at h. One should notice that in this truth condition, h is the value 
of the function g applied to the index 2, i.e. g(2) = h. So far, we have 
seen how the referential theory of tense deals with tense within formal 
semantics)O) However, the theory is not sufficient to account for the dis-
tributions of tense in natural language. This will be elaborated upon in 
the next section. 
3.1. Problems with the Referential Theory 
This sub-section is devoted to pointing out some problems with the 
referential theory. In many utterances, the speaker might use tenses, 
whether it is in the past or future tense, without making any reference 
c. FUTi translates as AP[FUT(ta & P(tDl 
In the translation (ia-c), P is a variable of type <s, <i, t» with the denotation of properties 
of intervals. The reader can consult with Song (2005) for more details. 
9) In (19), I simply translate the definite NP the race as the-race for convenience' sake. 
10) Note that the referential theory of tense has been more frequently incorporated into the 
Discourse Representation Theory (ORT) than into the formal framework discussed here in 
this paper. ORT is mainly concerned with understanding temporal sequncing in discourse, 
as in John walked in. He sat down, in much the same way as it treats a sequence of 
referential NPs like names and pronouns in discourse. 
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to a specific time picked out by the sentence in question. This is in fa-
vor of the quantification theory of tense which takes tense to be 
indefinite. For illustration, consider the following sentences: 
(20) a. Dinosaurs disappeared from the earth 
b. Einstein proposed the theory of the relativity 
Neither of the sentences in (20a) and (20b) makes reference to a specific 
interval in the past. In other words, we can say such sentences without 
referring to or presupposing any particular date and time in the past 
when those events described in (20a) and (20b) took place. Instead, they 
simply describe that those events occurred in the past. For example, 
(20a) is understood to mean that there was a past time at which dino-
saurs disappeared from the earth. This sentence makes sense even when 
the speaker does not have any particular time in his or her mind in ut-
tering it. This indicates that the treatment of the past tense as definite is 
not sufficient to account for the semantics of the past tense. 
The following sentences serve as examples that are against both the 
referential theory and the quantificational theory: 
(21) a. John did not lose his head 
b. John did not die in New York 
On the assumption that the negation is an operator, the meaning of (21a) 
can be represented as follows in terms of the operational analysis or the 
quantificational treatment of tense. 
(22) a. -'P[lose' (j, his-head)] 
b. *P-'[lose' (j, his-head)] 
The semantic representations in (22a-b) are based on the scope relation 
between the past tense operator and the negation. What (22a) says is 
that John never lost his head at any past time, while (22b) says that 
there was some time in the past at which John did not lose his head. 
Notice that (22a) is the correct reading for (21a), whereas (22b) is not. 
This is because what the past sentence in (21a) says that there was no 
past time whatsoever at which John lost his head, and hence, (22b) is 
too weak a meaning of (21a). The same argument goes for a sentence 
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like (2lb). Thus, sentences like (21a-b) are another set of examples which 
indicate that the Priorian treatment of tense (or the operational analysis) 
is not appropriate for dealing with tense in natural language. 
It is, however, worth noticing that the past event described in (21a) -
i.e. the event of John losing his head - does not make reference to a 
particular time, either. Suppose John is alive when (21a) is uttered. Then 
(21a) is understood to mean that he never lost his head at any past 
time, which implies that the past tense in (21a) is completely indefinite. 
This kind of explanation holds for a sentence like (21b), too. Thus, the 
referential theory does not take proper account of sentences like (21a-b). 
We have discussed neither of the two theories of tense is sufficient to 
provide a proper treatment of tenses in natural language. In what fol-
lows, I will elaborate on a more plausible way to deal with tense. 
4. Definition of Choice Functions 
Choice functions are employed in formal semantics as a possible sol-
ution to the violation of island constraints at the level of LF caused by 
indefinite NPs. Consider the following sentence: 
(23) a. The professor knows the fact that a student of mine joined the 
peace corps. 
b. For some x, x a student of mine, the professor knows the fact 
that x joined the peace corps. 
A sentence like (23a) contains an indefinite NP a student of mine with-
in the complex NP construction which constitutes an island. (23b) is the 
interpretation of (23a) with wide scope of the indefinite NP. As illus-
trated in (23b), the indefinite NP a student of mine takes scope over the 
whole matrix sentence. This indicates that the indefinite NP moves out 
of the island at LF. This kind of LF movement is illegal since it violates 
the island constraints according to which no elements can be extracted 
out of islands. 
To remedy this, some linguists like Reinhart (1977) attempt to in-
corporate choice functions into the wide-scope interpretation of indefinites. 
The basic idea of this approach is that the wide-scope interpretation of 
an indefinite NP might be obtainable without moving it out of the is-
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lands, in which case there is no such thing as the violation of island 
constraints in the first place, and that if the indefinite NP remains in 
situ, then it can be taken to be an argument, rather than a generalized 
quantifier. The choice function applies to the indefinite NP which is to 
be interpreted as having wide-scope. 
The wide-scope interpretation of (23a) can be represented roughly as 
follows in terms of the choice function: 
(24) :3 f [CH(f) & the professor knows the fact that f (student of mine) 
joined the peace corps 1 
(24) involves existential quantification over choice functions. One should 
also note that the indefinite NP remains in situ, instead of moving out 
to take wide scope over the whole matrix clause, as illustrated in (24). 
This means that the indefinite NP is interpreted as an argument of the 
verb and the interpretation in (24) definitely respects the island con-
straints on' movement since as was mentioned earlier, the indefinite NP 
stayed in situ. (24) says that there exists a choice function such that the 
professor knows the fact that the student picked out by this function 
joined the peace corps. Notice that in (24), f is a function that ranges 
over functions that select one individual from the set of possible denota-
tions of "student of mine." The value of f is fixed by the context. In oth-
er words, f is the function that applies to the set of "student of mine" to 
return a particular individual that the speaker has in mind at the utter-
ance time of (24). 
Given the interpretation of the choice function laid out in the pre-
vious paragraph, we can define the choice function as follows: 
(25) Definition of Choice Functions 
A function variable f is a choice function iff for any Cl' EO A, f(A) 
=Cl'. 
(N. B. A is a non-empty set) 
(25) says that f is a function that applies to a non-empty set to return a 
particular individual from that set. Recall that the value of f is de-
termined by the context of use. What about the predicate CH (for the 
choice function) in (25)? We need to define it for clear presentation of 
what the choice functions are like. Recall that the choice function varia-
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ble f is of type «e, t>, e>_ The predicate CH is of type <<<e, t>, e >, 1> 
with the denotation of the functions from the functions from the sets of 
individuals to individuals to truth values, since it takes the function var-
iable f to be its argument. Given this, the definition of CH can be stated 
as follows: 
(26) CH = A fvP(P 7'" 0 - P (f (P))], where P is a variable of type <e, t>. 
(26) says that if for everyone-place predicate it is a non-empty set, the 
predicate applies to the individual that the function variable f picks 
from that non-empty predicate - i.e. the individual f picks from the 
non-empty predicate is in the extension of that non-empty predicate. 
Since we have discussed the definition of the choice functions, we are 
now in a position to see how the choice function is applicable to the 
analysis of tense. This will be elaborated upon in what follows. 
5. Choice Functions and Temporal Interpretation 
This section mainly contains the discussion of the way I prefer to go 
with respect to the more appropriate treatment of the tenses in natural 
language, whether they are interpretable as definite or indefinite, by in-
corporating choice functions. As a first step toward the treatment, we 
need to define temporal predicates like past, present (henceforth PRES), 
and future (henceforth FUT). I assume that the temporal predicates are 
taken to be a set of intervals, as illustrated in (27a-c): 
(27) a. IIpastUU = that function hE Dd, t> such that for any iE I, h(i) = 1 
iff i precedes u)l) 
b. IIPRESllu = that function h E Dd, t> such that for any i E I, h(i) = 
1 iff i coincides with u. 
c. IIFUTllu = that function h E Dd, l> such that for any i E I, h(i) = 
1 iff i follows u. 
As was mentioned above, the temporal predicates in the semantics 
(27a-c) denote a set of intervals, and thus, they are of type <i, t> with 
11) In (27a-c), u refers to the utterance time, and i an intervaL 
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the denotation of the functions from intervals to truth values. They are 
also assumed to be partial functions. One should notice that the local 
evaluation time for the temporal predicates is the utterance time, which 
is provided in the context of use. 
Given this, we are ready to go through the main discussion. The basic 
idea that I have regarding the application of the choice functions to the 
temporal interpretation would be something like this: the choice func-
tion for temporal interpretation applies to the set of intervals denoted by 
each of the temporal predicates to yield an appropriate interval of that 
set of intervals. This can be represented as (28): 
(28) a. f(past): f applies to the set of intervals preceding u to return 
an appropriate interval of the set "past." 
b. f(PRES): f applies to the set of intervals simultaneous with u to 
return an appropriate interval of the set "PRES." 
c. f(FUT): f applies to the set of intervals following u to return 
an appropriate interval of the set "FUT." 
Recall that the temporal predicates like past, PRES, and FUT denote a 
set of intervals, and hence, they are of type <i, t>. As was mentioned in 
(28a-c), the function variable f takes the temporal predicates as its argu-
ments and the value of the function is an appropriate interval, and thus 
f is of type «i, t>, i> with the denotation of a function from sets of in-
tervals to an interval. The appropriate interval, which is a value of the 
application of the choice function, is obtained from the context of 
utterance. How does the choice function possibly get its value from the 
context of utterance? The answer to this question that I came across is 
something like this: we need to come up with choice function variables 
in such a way that they assign to every temporal predicate an interval 
among those which are members of the set denoted by that temporal 
predicate at which the eventuality picked out by the sentence in ques-
tion occurs. 
The next thing we should do is to define the choice function f that 
applies to the temporal predicates to make clear how the new system 
fits in. More precisely, we need to define the predicate CH over choice 
functions to make the function variable f appropriate for temporal 
interpretation. The definition of choice functions for temporal inter-
pretation I will explore in this paper is in analogy to that concerning in-
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definite NPs. Hence, in conjunction with (25) and (26), we can define the 
choice functions for tense as below: 
(29) Definition of choice functions for tense 
CH = A fVI[ I~ 0 ~ I (f 0))], where f is a variable of type «i, t>, i> 
and I is a variable of type d, t> with the denotation of sets of 
intervals. 
Notice that in (29), the predicate CH is of type «<i, t>, i>, t> with the de-
notation of a function from the function variable f to truth values. (29) 
says that a function variable f is a choice function for tense (Le. CH(f) 
holds) if and only if for every temporal predicate I which is a non-emp-
ty set of intervals,12) fO) is in the extension of I. To put it differently, the 
temporal predicate applies to an interval picked by the choice function 
variable f. It is worth noticing that the interval f picks is a member of 
the set to which that interval belongs. 
Armed with what we have discussed so far, let us consider some ex-
amples to see how the analysis proposed in this paper works. The exam-
ples we will see below mainly contain those which are not properly ac-
counted for in terms not only of the quantificational theory but also of 
the referential theory. Before launching into the discussion of how to 
deal with more complicated tensed sentences, consider a sentence like 
(30a) to which we can give a straightforward choice function analysis: 
(30) a. John arrived in Seoul 
b. 3 f [CH(f) & arrive-in-Seoul' (j, f (past))] 
In what follows, I will give a brief discussion of the characteristics the 
above analysis might have. A sentence like (30a) would translate into 
(30b) in terms of the choice function. One should note that in (30a), the 
predicate takes as its argument the temporal expression which is a do-
main of the choice function. This suggests that the predicates need one 
extra argument position which is reserved for temporal expressions. That 
is, the intransitive predicates require two arguments - one is an external 
one (Le. the subject) and the other a temporal one (Le. tense). The tran-
sitive predicates, on the other hand, need three arguments-the subject, 
12) Remember that the domain of the choice function should be a non-empty set. 
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the object, and tense. The proposal in which the temporal expressions 
serve to be arguments of the predicates implies an in-situ analysis - i.e. 
tenses remain in-situ with no movement at all. Hence, in this kind of 
treatment, there will be no such problem whatsoever as scope relations 
that may be caused by LF movement. This may be one advantage of 
the choice function analysis over the quantification theory. I will get 
back to this later in this section. 
In (30b), a choice function applies to a set of intervals. As was men-
tioned above, f(past) is an argument of the predicate arrive-in-Seoul, 
and it assigns the most salient interval as the value of the function f. 
Recall that the most salient interval is provided by the context of use. 
The translation in (30b) says that there exists a choice function f such 
that John arrived in Seoul at the interval that function picks. The inter-
val the choice function f picks in (30b) counts as the most salient time 
or the given time at the utterance time of (30a). The truth condition for 
(30) can be stated roughly as below: 
(31) (30b) is true at t with respect to M, w, g, and u iff there is a val-
ue assignment function g' <h/f>g13),14) such that g' (h) is a choice 
function and John arrives in Seoul at g' (h)(past). 
In the truth condition (31), g' (h)(past) makes reference to the interval 
the choice function picks, and it should be contained in the set of inter-
vals denoted by John arrives in Seoul for the sentence (30a) to be true. 
It should be remembered that as was mentioned briefly above, the pred-
icate like arrive is treated as a two-place predicate in our framework, 
hence it is of type <e, <i, t». The predicate arrive in Seoul combines 
with the subject John, which is base-generated in [SPEC, VP], and this 
leads John arrives in Seoul to be of type <i, t> with the denotation of a 
set of intervals. After that, John arrives in Seoul applies to the temporal 
predicate to which the choice function f has applied, and the resulting 
expression is reduced to the type i. 
Now let us get back to En<;'s (1986) example1S) which she claims to be 
13) One should recall that f and h denote a function of type «i, t>, b, rather than an in-
dividual of type e or i. 
14) The notation g' <h/f>g means g' is a value assignment function just like g except that it 
possibly assigns h to f. 
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a problem with the quantification analysis and see how the framework 
proposed in this paper will present a possible solution to Enr;:'s problem. 
Consider the sentence in (11), which is repeated below as (32) for con-
venience' sake: 
(32) Every member of our investment club will buy a house 
A sentence like (32) translates into (30) in terms of the choice function 
analysis: 
(33) :3 f [CH(f) & Y x[m.o.i.c(x) ~ buy' (x, a-house: f (FUT))] 
(33) is understood to assert that there exists a choice function f such 
that for every member of our investment club, he or she buys a house 
at the interval selected by that choice function. Notice that in (33), the 
interval the choice function picks from the predicate denoting FUT is 
the most salient interval posterior to the utterance time u. Thus, the 
eventuality described by (33) is located into the future, indicating that 
every member of our investment club will buy a house at the given 
time in the future. 
Let us get back to Enr;:'s problem. One should recall that Enr;: (1986) ar-
gues that a sentence like (32) makes a point against the quantificational 
approach to tense. According to her, (32) carries the meaning that ev-
ery-current-and-future member of our investment club will buy a house. 
However, the quantificational approach fails to capture the meaning of 
(32). The choice function treatment of tense is an in-situ analysis, as was 
mentioned above. Thus, the choice function analysis establishes no sco-
pal relation whatsoever between the universal quantifier and tense, 
which contrasts with the quantificational view of tense. This suggests 
that the problem with the Priorian treatment En<; (1986) points out does 
not exist in the first place. Depending on the context of the utterance of 
(31), the universal quantifier binding the variable x in (33) might denote 
every-current-and-future member of our investment club. This is a de-
15) Recall that I have argued Enc;:'s arguments against the quantificational analysis may be 
somewhat weak because her main point against it is not so much directly relevant to the 
way it treats tense as closely related to the context-dependent characteristics of the do-
main of quantificational NPs. 
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sired consequence on Enc;:'s part. 
Finally, let us get back to the example which neither the quantifica-
tional theory nor the referential theory takes an appropriate account of 
and see how the choice function analysis of tense deals with it. Consider 
the sentence (14a), which is repeated below as (34): 
(34) John did not die in New York 
As we discussed in sub-section 2.1, the past tense in (34) might be in-
terpreted to be definite or indefinite, depending on the context of use. 
Let us consider two scenarios to make this clear. Scenario #1: suppose 
John actually died in Boston. In this situation, a sentence like (34) car-
ries the meaning that John never died in New York at any past time. 
This is an indefinite interpretation of the past tense. Scenario #2: sup-
pose John visited New York and he was hit by a car, but fortunately he 
did not die at that time. In this situation, the past tense in (34) is in-
terpreted to make reference to a definite past time - Le. the time John 
was hit by a car when he visited New York. Recall that the past tense 
in scenario #1 makes a point against the referential theory, while the 
past tense in scenario #2 the quantificational theory. In what follows, I 
will discuss how the framework proposed in this paper provides a prop-
er treatment of a sentence like (34). 
A sentence like (34) translates into (35) in terms of the choice function 
analysis. 
(35) :3 f [CH(f) & -, die-in-NY' (j, f(past))] 
(35) is understood to assert that there exists a choice function f such 
that John does not die at the given interval this choice function selects. 
In this case, the interval picked by the choice function is the most sali-
ent interval preceding the utterance time. The eventuality picked out by 
(34) is shifted into a past time, and hence (35) says that John did not die 
in New York at the given past time. In case of scenario #1, the interval 
selected by the choice function (Le. f(past)) is tantamount to the whole 
interval of John's life. Consequently, (35) is semantically equivalent to 
(36) which is represented in terms of the quantificational treatment, im-
plicating that it's not the case that John died in New York at any past 
time during his whole life: 
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(36) -'P(die-in-NY' (j)) 
Thus, the choice function analysis successfully captures the meaning of 
the indefinite past arising from scenario #1. In scenario #2, on the other 
hand, f(past) in (35) selects the interval when John went to New York 
and was hit by a car. Thus, (35) implicates that John did ndt die in New 
York at a given past interval when he was hit by a car in New York. 
This is how the choice function analysis captures the definite past aris-
ing from scenario #2)6) 
I'd like to mention one thing before closing this section. The inter-
pretation of tense in natural language is completely context-dependent. It 
may make reference to a particular time in some context, whereas this 
is not the case in other context. As we saw above, the choice function 
analysis takes a proper account of the semantic interpretation of tense 
that is context-dependent - that is, it can be interpreted as being definite 
or indefinite. This might be made possible because the choice function 
itself is characterized by the contextually supplied interpretation. For ex-
ample, as we saw in the two scenarios, the past interval picked by the 
choice function is John's whole life time in scenario #1, and it is, on the 
other hand, one specific time in scenario #2. The fact that the choice 
function analysis of tense can capture the (in)definite interpretation of 
tense gives it one advantage over the two traditional rivals)?) It can pro-
16) An anonymous referee pointed out to me that the IL translation in (35) might not be the 
right way to represent the semantics of an ambiguous sentence like (34), since the two 
readings of (34) are represented in terms of one single IL translation (35), which appears 
to depart from the so-called semantic principle that if a sentence allows n-many readings, 
then we need n-many semantic representations. However, (35) is not deviant from the 
principle. Recall that the interval picked out by the choice function is completely depend-
ent upon the use of context. Suppose that John read a book at 3:15, then f(past) = 3:15, and 
John slept at 2 a. rn., then f(past) = 2 a. m. Similarly, the interval picked out by the choice 
function in (35) is different, depending on whether (34) was uttered in scenario #1 or in 
scenario #2. The choice function analysis is not the only one that the interpretation of in-
tervals is context-dependent. We can witness this parallelism in the extended now theory 
which is meant to treat the semantics of the perfect. That is, the interval picked out by 
the extended now predicate XN, as in XN(t), is also different from context to context. 
17) One anonymous referee says that the specific use of indefinites is different from definite 
NPs in that the only the latter presupposes both the speaker and the hearer identify the 
referent of the linguistic form in question. For this reason, it is unclear how choice func-
tions can be applied to the use of definite NPs, so it is unclear how they can be applied 
to the definite use of tense. The difference between the specific indefiniteness and defi-
niteness the anonymous referee mentioned does not always hold. In the semantic liter-
ature, the specific reading of the indefinite NPs (or the referential use of the indefinites 
in the sense of Fodor and Sag (1982)) is semantically nearly close (Heim (1982) and Ent;: 
On the Proper Treatment of Tense in English 849 
vide a unified way to treat tense in natural language. 
6. Choice Functions and Empty Sets 
So far, we have explored a more plausible alternative way to deal 
with tense, no matter whether it is marked as being definite or indef-
inite, by incorporating choice functions. As was mentioned above, what 
is important concerning the choice functions is that the choice functions 
must apply to a non-empty set. Otherwise, the semantic derivation would 
be crushed since the choice function might pick nothing out of the set. 
As a result, we would fail to calculate the meaning of a sentence. In this 
section, I will investigate a possible way out when the choice function 
applies to an empty set, as exemplified in (37a) and its logical translation 
(37b). 
(37) a. Martians attacked the earth 
b. :3f [CH(f) & attack'(m, the-earth, f (past))] 
(37b) says that there exists a choice function such that Martian attacked 
the earth at a certain time in the past the choice function picks. In the 
world we live, there was no past time whatsoever at which Martians at-
tacked the earth. In other words, the set of intervals at which Martian 
attacked the earth is an empty set. Therefore, there is no interval avail-
able for the choice function to pick, since in (37b), the domain of the 
choice function is an empty set. Given that the choice functions apply to 
an empty set, the following question will arise: How can we calculate 
the truth value of a sentence like (37a)? The answer to this question will 
be elaborated upon in what follows. 
The strategy I will adopt in this paper to deal with this situation is 
along the lines of that of what I call the presuppositional treatment of 
(1991)), or identical (Partee (1972)) to the meaning of definite NPs. Given this, the choice 
functions can be applied to the semantics of definite NPs. This has already been elabo-
rated in Song (2004). Furthermore, just as indefinite NPs are ambiguous between specific 
(or referential) and non-specific reading, so are definite NPs. In case of definite NPs, the 
former and the latter are equivalent to as 'referential' and 'attributive', respectively in the 
sense of Donellan (1966). The attributive reading of the definite NPs does not have to re-
quire the presupposition that the hearer identifies their referent (cf. Partee (1972)). Besides, 
Stalnaker (1974) argues that presuppositions are established on the speaker's part, rather 
than on the hearer's part. 
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definite descriptions discussed in Heim and Kratzer (1998) and Song 
(2004).18) According to the presuppositional treatment, if the presup-
position induced by a certain expression were satisfied, then we would 
be able to calculate the semantics of the sentence, and if not, on the 
other hand, the sentence would be uninterpretable - i.e. no truth values 
would be able to be assigned to the sentence.19) To illustrate this, consid-
er the following sentence: 
(38) The president of our social club knows something about semantics 
The definite description the president of our social club in a sentence 
like (38) presupposes that there exists a president in our social club. The 
presuppositional treatment would say something about calculating the 
meaning of (38) like this. If the presupposition triggered by the definite 
description is felicitous, then the function denoted by president of our 
social club would be in the domain of the function denoted by the defi-
nite article the, which is assumed to be a partial function. If that is the 
case, we can apply the function the to the expression president of our 
social club, and in consequence, it would be able to pick one unique en-
tity that is a president of our social club. In contrast, the function de-
noted by president of our social club would not be in the domain of 
the, when the presupposition failure takes place. What we thus end up 
would be that we are unable to continue calculating the meaning.20) 
Let us get back to the main line of discussion. I will make a similar 
argument regarding the case where the choice functions apply to an 
empty set. Like the definite descriptions, tenses trigger presuppositions as 
well. For instance, the past tense presupposes that the time of the even-
tuality picked out by the sentence in question precedes the utterance 
time, and the present tense presupposes that the time of an eventuality 
coincides with the utterance time, and so on. Given this, a sentence like 
18) Following Frege, Heim and Kratzer (1998) claim that the definite descriptions like the need 
to be treated as being presuppositonal in the sense that if the presupposition triggered by 
them are not satisfied, then the sentence will not be able to be assigned a meaning. Song 
(2004) extends this idea into the application of the choice functions to the semantics of 
the definite descriptions. 
19) It is worth noting that the presuppositional analysis departs from the classical treatment 
like the Russellian and the Montagovian analysis. 
20) One should note that this is something different from saying that a sentence like (55) is 
false if the presupposition is infelicitous. 
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(37a) presupposes that the event of Martians attacking the earth oc-
curred prior to the utterance time. As we saw above in the presupposi-
tional treatment of the definite descriptions, if the presupposition trig-
gered by the past tense in (37a) is felicitous, then the function denoted 
by the temporal predicate past21) would be in the domain of the choice 
function, which is a partial function. If so, we would be able to apply 
the choice function to the temporal predicate (Le. f(past) holds) and it 
would be able to pick the most salient interval. As a result, we would 
be able to assign a meaning to (37a). On the contrary, what if the pre-
supposition in (37a) were infelicitous? In this case, the function denoted 
by the temporal predicate past would not be in the domain of the choice 
function-i.e. the domain of the choice function is empty. Thus, the choice 
function would not be able to apply to the function denoted by the tem-
poral predicate past. Consequently, a sentence like (37a) would not be 
able to be assigned a meaning, which amounts to saying that (37a) is 
pragmatically anomalous because of the presupposition failure.22) 
7. Conclusion 
Tense in natural language is frequently interpreted as being definite 
in some context, and indefinite in other context. This paper has argued 
that neither the quantificational approach nor the referential approach is 
sufficient to provide a proper semantic treatment of tense since they 
21) Remember that the temporal predicates are of type <i, b with the denotation of functions 
from intervals to truth values. 
22) One anonymous reviewer argues that this claim is strong in the sense that it leads us to 
say we don't know the truth values of a sentence, even when that sentence is false. 
However, one should recall that what this paper argues is that a sentence like (37) is as-
signed no semantic value since we can't calculate a semantics of a sentence like (37). This 
view, first proposed by Frege, is accepted by semanticists like Heim and Krazter (1998) and 
Stalnaker (1974) among others. Let's get back to (37). Once we are aware that Martians nev-
er attacked the earth, as was mentioned above, it is hard to say which interval a sentence 
like (37) makes reference to. The most plausible answer is that (37) does not denote any in-
terval at all. This means that (37) has no semantic value. That is, there is no such thing as 
the interval picked out by (37). This is because the function denoted by the temporal predi-
cate PAST is not in the domain of the choice functioIL If it is not in the domain, then the 
choice function cannot apply to it, which suggests that we cannot apply functional applica-
tion to calculate a semantics for (37). Given this, we can say that the choice function is a 
partial functioIL Inasmuch as there is no past time whatsoever at which Martians attacked 
the earth, it is reasonable to say (37) picks out no appropriate interval. This suggests that 
the semantic interpretation of a sentence like (37) crashes because no further semantic cal-
culation is allowed Thus, (37) is semantically and pragmatically anomalous. 
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both fail to capture the variability of tense. In order to treat tense in a 
more proper way by capturing its variability, I have proposed the choice 
function analysis of tense in this paper. The choice functions are charac-
terized by the fact that they apply to a non-empty set to yield a partic-
ular entity from that set. The choice function analysis proposed here is 
meant to account for the semantics of tense by extending the basic no-
tion of the choice function to the treatment of tense. That is, the choice 
function for tense applies to a non-empty set of intervals and picks from 
the set a certain interval the speaker has in mind at the utterance time. 
Depending on the context of use, the interval selected by the choice 
function might be definite or indefinite. This is how the choice function 
analysis captures the variability of tense which has not been well ac-
counted for in terms of the two traditional rivals. Besides, this approach 
has one advantage over the two traditional approaches since it can pro-
vide a unified way to treat the semantics of tense. To my knowledge, 
what has been proposed in this paper is a first attempt, and further re-
search is definitely needed to evaluate this. 
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